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Life cycle saving decisions belong to the most complex financial decisions that
we are faced with in our life. Psychologists have found that when making complex
decisions people use short-cuts in the form of minimum requirements for particular
attribute categories of choice options. This paper presents a new simple life cycle
model where agents do invoke such minimum requirements. The model is highly
tractable and parsimonious. Calibrations show that it allows us to better under-
stand important data on saving and asset allocation. It is shown that the model is
much better able to explain these data than standard workhorse models even when
generously controlling for subtle differences in the “degrees of freedom” between the
new and existing models.
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1 Introduction
Some economic decisions, such as daily shopping, may be seen as truly simple. Others
may be less simple, but often more difficult economic decision are made frequently under
similar circumstances. As a result, individuals develop a considerable amount of expertise
through experience. In contrast, some economic decisions are truly difficult ones and are
not made on a routinely basis. A prime example is life cycle saving and retirement
preparation, which are the topic of this paper. It is hard to deny that such decisions are
particularly complex, even with the help of financial experts.1 Furthermore, such decisions
are made relatively infrequently. And, while you get more or less immediate feedback on
whether you made a suitable decision when having bought a new car or moved into a new
apartment, there is no comparable feedback for life cycle saving decisions. Typically, you
may get feedback only decades later. Clearly, this hinders learning.
The question of how people deal with complex decisions has been the subject of a
large number of studies in psychology. Decision making usually entails choosing one out
of several choice alternatives. Each alternative is characterized by a number of attributes.
Psychologists have found that when facing complex decision tasks, people come up with
minimum thresholds (deliberatively or rather “intuitively”) for at least some of the at-
tribute categories. These minimum thresholds serve as criteria for making choices in that
a decision maker disregards any alternative for which these minimum criteria are not met.
This procedure greatly reduces the number of relevant alternatives and hence simplifies
decision making considerably.2 Such a procedure differs greatly from decision patterns
under standard expected utility maximization. In the language of microeconomics, min-
1Readers who believe that consulting expert advice would make life cycle saving a piece of cake are re-
ferred to www.consumerreports.org/cro/money. In particular, the summary of a report on financial advice
reads as: “We also found that paying thousands of dollars to an independent financial professional doesn’t
guarantee perfection either. The bottom line: You can’t expect to hand off your finances to someone and
put your retirement on autopilot no matter how much you pay. As you’ll see from the experiences of three
testers [...], financial planning is a time-consuming and sometimes nerve-wracking process. You can’t avoid
spending hours on preparation, which should include checking on the adviser’s background and doing some
soul-searching to figure out how to balance your current financial needs and desires with your retirement
goals.” (See http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/personal-investing/bargain-financial-advisers-
206/overview/index.htm.)
2See Section 2 for a brief summary of the psychological literature.
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imum thresholds lead to discontinuous choice modes. In the language of psychologists,
such decision making is called noncompensatory. The reason for the latter terminology
is that if an alternative entails attribute values below a minimum threshold in some cat-
egory, it is not possible to compensate individuals for this shortfall by sufficiently high
values of attributes in other categories.
Since life cycle saving and retirement preparation are especially complex economic
decisions, this psychological finding seems particularly relevant for understanding how
people deal with these decisions. This paper will provide a new simple and parsimonious
model of life cycle saving where decision making is characterized by the use of minimum
thresholds which will be dubbed threshold goals.
The paper demonstrates that a very simple model, incorporating such threshold goals
into a preference framework, has great power to explain cross-sectional patterns of saving
and asset allocation choices. In particular, the threshold goal model is much better
able to explain the cross-sectional variation of saving and asset allocation choices with
income than standard workhorse models. This holds even when generously controlling
for subtle differences in the degrees of freedom or “flexibility” between the threshold goal
and alternative models.
It is a critical issue to identify the appropriate list of threshold goals that are likely to
be relevant in the domain of life cycle saving. The strategy I pursue is to look for threshold
goal elements that appear in the existing literature and are likely to be relevant for life
cycle savings. A first threshold goal element that has commonly been incorporated into
economic models of intertemporal decision making and asset pricing is habit formation
(Campbell and Cochrane, 1999, Constantinides, 1990, Gomes and Michaelides, 2003). A
habit level of consumption can also be seen as a reference point (Bowman et al., 1999).
In the model of this paper it will be assumed that decision makers disregard all saving
or asset allocation plans for which it is not guaranteed (or extremely likely) that future
consumption exceeds a habit level. The difference between the new threshold goal model
and existing habit formation models is discussed below.
The model includes a second threshold goal referring to current consumption (and,
indirectly via habit formation, also to future consumption). Given habit formation, it
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is assumed that the an agent desires to come as close as feasible to a certain “normal”
standard of living. The idea is to capture, in a stylized manner, the finding in the literature
that people seem to be concerned about how their standard of living compares to a
reference consumption level (Easterlin (1974), (1995); see Clark et al. (forthcoming) for a
recent survey). This reference level can be understood as the average standard of living in
a reference group or in the society as a whole. It is also likely to correspond to generation-
specific aspiration levels (Clark et al., forthcoming). The existence of such reference
consumption levels explains why, for developed countries, the “average” happiness within
a country increases only very little with economic growth.
Overall, the threshold goal model works as follows. Agents’ overall or residual goal
is simply to maximize a weighted average of “utility” from current and expected future
consumption. Such a risk-neutral overall objective function provides the simplest possible
way to capture that agents are making a trade-off between current and future consumption
and, in principle, like to have more of both. However, agents only consider to choose
among decision alternatives for which the threshold goals are met. In particular, agents
reject all alternative for which the habit level is not achieved. Among the remaining
choices they reject all alternatives which do not come as close as feasible to achieving the
normal standard of living.
There are two main differences to existing habit formation models. First, such models
do not include the threshold goal of a normal standard of living. The latter is crucial for
the main predictions of the threshold goal model, namely that both saving rates and the
proportion of savings invested in equities increase with income, in a way that is consistent
with empirical estimates but not easily obtainable from existing models.3 Second, the
overall objective function in the threshold goal model is much simpler than for standard
habit formation models since there is no element of risk aversion, in the sense of a concave
utility function over risky prospects. Not only does this make the model particularly
tractable but it also leads to much simpler patterns of behavior. Habit formation is the
only source of risk aversion in the threshold goal model.
3See Sections 7 and 8.
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To focus on the simplest and most parsimonious case, the paper considers a two-
period life cycle model. In this model all decisions are made in the first period. In the
second period the agent simply consumes whatever resources are available, depending on
the state of the world that will materialize. Restricting the analysis to the two-period
case allows to abstract from the intricate issue of how decision makers deal with the
so-called “continuation problem,” i.e. whether and how they take into account today
what decisions they will make at future knots of the decision tree. An investigation how
boundedly rational decision makers may deal with this issue is beyond the scope of this
paper and is addressed in Binswanger (2007a). Second, in a two-period framework it is
particularly straightforward to compare calibrations of the new threshold goal model to
calibrations of existing models.
The idea that economic decision making is heavily influenced by threshold goals goes
at least back to Simon (1955). However, to my knowledge, this idea has not formally been
applied to the study of life cycle decision making, so far. Existing behavioral life cycle
models include the mental accounting model of Shefrin and Thaler (1988), the hyperbolic
discounting model (e.g. Laibson, 1997, Laibson et al., 1998), and the loss aversion model
of Bowman et al. (1999). These models do not include any noncompensatory elements
of decision making. Gabaix and Laibson (2000, 2005) analyze abstract decision tasks
where agents are to choose an initial “action” which triggers a chain of probabilistic
consequences. Gabaix and Laibson develop models of how boundedly rational agents
may process information on the probabilistic consequences of a given choice by using
simple algorithms. In contrast, the threshold goal model is not a model of information
processing. Rather, it describes how individuals are making choices by using threshold
goals that refer to attributes of their choice alternatives.
As already mentioned, Binswanger (2007a) presents a multi-period model which, in
the static case of two periods, coincides with the threshold goal model of this paper.
Binswanger (2007a) is concerned with how boundedly rational agents may deal with
the challenging problem that their satisfaction today may depend on choices in the more
distant future, which choices may depend on choices made in intermediate periods between
now and the more distant future etc. The idea put forward there is that agents may have
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simple feasibility goals for future consumption along a few scenarios, such as a worst-
case and a “normal” scenario. The idea of feasibility goals is intrinsically related to a
multi-period framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the relevant
psychological literature. Section 3 introduces the threshold goal model formally. Section 4
presents the setup regarding the economic environment. Section 5 provides the analytical
solution of the model. Section 6 discusses how the model can be calibrated. Section
7 presents calibration results for a set of baseline parameter values as well as a host of
alternative specifications. Section 8 compares the predictive power of the model to other
existing models that are commonly used to study life cycle savings. Section 9 concludes.
2 A Summary of the Psychological Literature
In psychology there has been a large amount of experimental research investigating
whether people are using noncompensatory decision rules and whether they are more
prone to do so when a decision task becomes more complex. In a typical experiment
people are asked to choose, say, an apartment, given information about several attribute
categories such as size, distance from working place etc. The experiments are designed
in a way such that the experimenter can observe the information that a subject has been
using when making her decision.4 It is the pattern of information processing that re-
veals whether a decision maker has been using compensatory or noncomensatory decision
strategies. In order to make a decision in the compensatory mode a decision maker has
to evaluate a larger amount of information. In particular, she has to check all attribute
values of a given option, since she may always be willing to accept being compensated for
a low value in one category by a sufficiently high value in another. In contrast, in the non-
compensatory mode a decision maker will start by checking the values of the attributes
for the categories for which she has a minimum requirement in mind. This will lead to an
outright rejection of many alternatives, such that no further information is investigated
for these alternatives.
4The two methods used are verbal protocol analysis and information boards (see Ford et al., 1989).
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Ford et al. (1989) provide a large survey summarizing 45 studies that investigate
decision modes. They put their conclusion as follows (p. 105).5
Two substantive conclusions are derive from the review of the empirical evi-
dence. First, from an overall perspective, the results firmly demonstrate the
extensive use of noncompensatory strategies in completing the problem task. In
most studies, the nonlinear [= noncompensatory] use of cues was the dominant
mode of decision making identified by the researchers. Compensatory strategies
[...] were used when the number of alternatives and dimensions were small or
after a number of task stimuli were eliminated from consideration. [...]
Focusing more specifically on the determinants of strategy use, a second sub-
stantive conclusion is that the most robust findings associated with the set of
studies reviewed is that task complexity is strongly related to strategy use. The
research indicates that as the number of dimensions and alternatives increase,
there is a greater likelihood that the decision maker will use nonlinear strate-
gies. This finding has been found with different types of samples (students,
consumers, professional staffs), different types of tasks (housing decisions, con-
sumer product decisions, evaluations of others), and across both verbal protocol
analysis and information board approaches to [decision] process tracing.
The quote highlights that the observation that people are switching to noncompen-
satory decision modes when making complex choices has the status of a stylized fact. So
far, there has been very little attempt to incorporate this stylized fact into analyses of
economic decision making.
3 The Threshold Goal Model
Formally, the threshold goal model can be understood as a preference model where pref-
erences are represented by the list of threshold goals, plus a residual goal that determines
5Interested readers are also referred to Beach and Mitchell (1978), Bröder (2003), Einhorn (1971),
Newell and Simon (1972), Payne (1976), and Payne et al. (1993).
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behavior overall when all threshold goals are achieved. For simplicity, I will refer to the
entries in this list just as “goals.” Individual behavior is determined by maximization of
a goal i in the list, subject to achieving the maximum of all goals with an index smaller
than i, and subject to budget constraints. The particular goal i is determined as the goal
with the highest index, such that achieving the maximum of all goals with a lower index is
feasible. Generally speaking, the higher an individual’s income, the higher is the number
of goals for which the maximum can be achieved.
Specifically, LLA preferences are represented by the list
Λ = {I(c̃min2 ≥ αc1), min[c1, c̄], Ec̃2(c1 − c̄)
γ}, (1)
containing three goals. The first entry in the list specifies the threshold goal of achieving
a habit level of consumption in all future circumstances. In particular, the decision maker
will never choose a plan for which it is not assured that at least a fraction α > 0 of first-
period consumption c1 can be consumed in the second period. c̃
min
2 denotes minimum
second-period consumption. I denotes the indicator function. It takes on a value of
one whenever c̃min2 ≥ αc1, and of zero otherwise. The first goal is thus maximized if
c̃min2 ≥ αc1.
6 Clearly, achieving the first goal in (1) is only feasible if there exists a
financial asset with strictly positive returns in all states of the world. In the following
it will be assumed that such an asset exists, which provides a useful simplification. c̃min2
should not be understood too literally. It is rather intended to represent a level of future
consumption that can be achieved with a very high probability, e.g. 99 percent.
Consider next the second goal. It takes on a value of c1 or c̄, whichever is smaller. It
expresses the desire to achieve a normal standard of living c̄ ≥ 0 and represents a further
threshold goal. For simplicity, c̄ is treated as exogenous. Combining the first and the
second goal in (1), it follows that an individual maximizes c1 s.t. c̃
min
2 ≥ αc1 and the
budget constraints, as long as income is sufficiently low such that the resulting optimal
choice of c1 does not exceed the threshold goal c̄.
6It should be noted that, if (1) is literally understood as a preference model, an increase in c1 may
make an individual worse off, holding everything else constant. This is an intrinsic property of habit
formation models.
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If income is sufficiently high, such that fully achieving the first two goals is feasible,
behavior is determined by the third goal, which represents the residual goal. It specifies
nonsatiation in c1 and the expected level of second-period consumption Ec̃2 (E stands
for the mathematical expectation operator), as well as a complementarity between c1 and
Ec̃2. The degree of complementarity is determined by the parameter γ > 0. Beyond this,
the third goal entails a desire for “speculative” savings in the sense of a preference for a
high value of Ec2. Subtracting c̄ from c1 assures that c1 represents a strictly normal good
at all income levels. Note that the marginal rate of substitution between c1 and Ec̃2 is
always well defined for c1 > c̄. It is only when this inequality holds that the third goal
is actually relevant. It should be emphaized that the desire to reach a habit threshold
provides the only source of risk aversion in the model since the third goal entails risk
neutrality. This provides the simplest way to capture a basic risk-return trade-off.
Inspection of (1) shows that c1 and c̃2 enter preferences in a somewhat asymmetric way.
First, the evaluation of the random consumption stream c̃2 is split up into the separate
evaluation of c̃min2 and of Ec̃2. In contrast, no such splitting occurs for c1 because it is
deterministic. Second, c̃2 is evaluated relative to the habit level αc1. In contrast, c1 is not
evaluated against any initial value of a habit stock variable. Rather, c1 is evaluated relative
to the reference point c̄. Note that c̃2 is implicitly also evaluated against a reference point
αc̄. The reason is that the first goal in (1) implies that an expansion of c1 towards c̄ only
has value if at the same time c̃min2 is expanded towards αc̄. In this sense, a more symmetric
model specification could be achieved by specifying the third goal as (Ec̃2 − αc̄) (c1 − c̄)
γ.
This would not lead to any qualitatively different predictions. The mentioned asymmetries
all stem from an attempt to keep the model as simple and tractable as possible.7
A question that naturally may come up is whether there is any compelling logic behind
the order of the goals in (1). Clearly, it must be that the two threshold goals precede the
non-saturable overall goal of maximizing Ec̃2(c1 − c̄)
γ. Given this, suppose that the order
of the first and second threshold goal would be reversed. This would mean that a decision
7Beyond that, the asymmetries might nevertheless raise worries about the possibility to extend pref-
erences (1) to a multi-period setting. It is shown in Binswanger (2007a) that a natural such extension
with an isomorphic parameterization does indeed exist.
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maker would first want to achieve a normal standard of living during working age before
she would care in any way at all about her future standard of living. Thus, choices would
be fully myopic for a certain range of lower incomes, which seems rather odd. Overall, I
view the order of arguments as stated in (1) as the only plausible one.
4 The Economic Environment
The analysis focuses on a stylized setup where the first period corresponds to working
life and the second period to retirement. Individuals earn a positive exogenous income in
the first and active period of their life. In contrast, income is zero in the second period
of life. Thus, the model does not specify Social Security income or other sources of non-
private retirement income. The reason for this is that the model will later be calibrated
and compared to empirical estimates of saving rates that take into account non-private
sources of retirement income (see Section 7).
The stylized time setup of the model is best understood as follows. Suppose that
an agent starts working at age W , retires at age R and dies with certainty at age
D. One may now conceive that in each year during working life an agent is prepar-
ing for (D − R) / (R − W ) years during retirement. More precisely, the household may
be thought to prepare during the year where she is aged W for her old age consump-
tion at ages from R to R + (D − R) / (R − W ); and during the year where she is aged
W +1 she may prepare for her old age consumption at ages from R +(D − R) / (R − W )
to R + 2 (D − R) / (R − W ). The average time horizon for this retirement preparation
amounts then to (D − W ) /2 years. In this case, the household solves R − W identical
life cycle problems, which have the form of the problem analyzed in this paper.
Individuals face two decisions. They have to decide how much to save and how to
allocate their savings between stocks and bonds. The returns of both financial assets are
exogenously given. For simplicity, housing is omitted, as in a large body of existing work
on life cycle saving.8
8See e.g. Carroll (1997), Campbell and Viceira (2002), Cocco et al. (2005).
9
Denote bond holdings by b, stock holdings by s, and first-period income by w. Fur-
thermore, denote gross return of bonds by x̃. Bond returns are possibly risky, as indicated
by the tilde. Gross stock returns are denoted by ỹ. I will make the following assumption
about return distributions.
Assumption 1 (i) x̃ ∈ [x, x], (ii) ỹ ∈ [y, y], (iii) 0 ≤ y < x and Eỹ > Ex̃, (iv)
Pr[x̃ = x, ỹ = y] > 0.
Part (i) and (ii) specify the support of bond and stock returns. Part (iii) states that
stocks have a larger downside risk than bonds. But the larger risk is compensated by
a higher expected return. Finally, by (iv) it is assumed that there is a strictly positive
probability that both assets realize their minimum returns. This rules out that investing
in stocks allows for increasing the minimum return of a portfolio with respect to a pure
bond portfolio.
Budget constraints are given by
c1 + b + s = w, (2)
c̃2 = bx + sỹ. (3)
Furthermore, I assume that
b ≥ 0, s ≥ 0 (4)
must hold, i.e. there is no borrowing and short selling. This is again a usual assumption
in the literature (see e.g. Cocco et al., 2005).
5 An Analytical Solution of the Model
Optimal choices have to be analyzed separately for low and high income levels. Specif-
ically, fully achieving the first two goals in (1) will only be feasible if w is sufficiently
high. (Fully achieving the first goal is always feasible since x > 0, which follows from
Assumption 1.) Denote the threshold value of w for which the first two goals are just
10




bx + sy ≥ αc1,
c1 + b + s = w
c1 ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, s ≥ 0,
(5)
where (3) and Assumption 1 have been used for the first constraint.
For w > wcrit an individual maximizes the third goal in (1), subject to fully achieving
the first two goals. As any monotonic transformation of an objective function does not
change the outcome of an optimization problem, this program may be stated as
max
c1, b, s
γ ln(c1 − c̄) + ln(bEx̃ + sEỹ) s. t.
bx + sy ≥ αc1,
c1 ≥ c̄,
c1 + b + s = w
c1 ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, s ≥ 0.
(6)
The rest of this section deals with the solution to the two programs (5) and (6),
respectively. Let us begin with problem (5). For this program, optimal stock holdings
are zero. Suppose that stock holdings were positive, instead, and consider whether an
individual can do better by substituting all stock holdings by bonds. Since x > y, habit
consumption can then be maintained with less resources. Hence, the individual can afford
a higher level of c1 without jeopardizing the habit goal, thus realizing a higher value of
the objective function in (5). It follows from this (and the budget and non-negativity
constraints) that c1 =
x
α+x
w and b = α
α+x
w. It remains to determine the range of incomes
for which program (5) applies. This will be the case if and only if the resulting choice of
c1 does not exceed c̄, i.e. if and only if
x
α+x
w ≤ c̄. This is equivalent to w ≤ α+x
x
c̄. This
yields the following result.
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Proposition 1 If w ≤ wcrit ≡ α+x
x
c̄, then c1 =
x
α+x
w, b = α
α+x
w, s = 0.
Proof. See the text above.
Proposition 1 is of interest since it provides a very simple solution to the so-called
stock market participation puzzle. Empirically, a substantial fraction of households do
not participate in the stock market in any country of the world. In particular, households
with a relatively lower income are much less likely to participate in the stock market
(see Section 7). In contrast, expected utility models predict that all households should
participate in the stock market if the equity premium is positive, at least in the absence
of fixed costs of stock market participation (see e.g. Gollier, 2001). Typically, predicted
equity shares are quite substantial for reasonable calibrations of expected utility as well as
more general models (Cocco et al. 2005, Gomes and Michaelides, 2005, see also Section 8).
The stock market participation puzzle refers to the fact that this is so much at variance
with the data. According to Proposition 1, the threshold goal model is able to explain
stock market non-participation for lower levels of income (as well as high levels of γ.)
According to the threshold goal model, earners of a lower income save exclusively for
precautionary reasons. Their only saving motive is to guarantee the threshold goal of
a habit consumption level, as this is a more basic goal than the desire to savor a high
expected old age consumption. Evidently, maintaining habit consumption is achieved
most efficiently by only investing in the asset with the lowest downside risk, i.e. bonds.
This explanation of the stock market participation puzzle is certainly not very challenging
from an intellectual point of view (nor is the usual explanation of the puzzle by means of
fixed costs). However, this does not preclude that threshold goals do play an important
role in deciding whether or not to enter the stock market.
Although the threshold goal model is close in spirit to existing habit formation models,
the latter are not able to explain the stock market participation puzzle (Gomes and
Michaelides, 2003). What is crucial for the predictive success of the threshold goal model
with respect to the participation puzzle is the strict sequential priority order of goals.
Individuals for which the second goal of an average standard of living is not yet achieved
are not at all concerned about the third goal. In contrast, there is only one holistic
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objective function for existing habit formation models. For these, all agents share the
same full range of “goals,” so to speak. As a result, there are always both a precautionary
and a speculative motive of saving.
I next characterize the solution to problem (6) which is relevant for w > wcrit. There
are three possible types of solutions. First, in some cases it may be optimal to choose
b > 0, s = 0. Second, it may occur that b > 0, s > 0 or, finally, b = 0, s > 0. It will
turn out that all three cases can occur, depending on the values of w and/or γ. For the
statement of the results it is convenient to define Ω ≡ (α+x)Eỹ−(α+y)Ex̃. Furthermore,
γ̄ ≡ xΩ
α(x−y)Ex̃
and w̄ ≡ (α+x)Ω
xΩ−αγ(x−y)Ex̃
c̄.
Proposition 2 Assume w > wcrit. If w ≤ w̄ or γ ≥ γ̄, then c1 =
x
α+x





Note that w̄ > wcrit for γ < γ̄. To see this, verify that we would have w̄ = wcrit for
γ = 0. But w̄ is a strictly increasing function of γ for γ < γ̄. This implies the strict
inequality. Thus, Proposition 2 shows that surpassing the threshold income wcrit will not
immediately lead to positive equity investments. The reason is that, locally around c̄, the
marginal value of an increase in c1 is close to infinity. In contrast, the marginal value of
an increase in Ec̃2 is finite, since the validity of the first constraint of program (6) implies
that Ec̃2 sufficiently exceeds zero. This feature of the model assures that c1 is always
a strictly normal good. For similar reasons, we have s = 0 when γ is sufficiently high.
Then, the relative value of a marginal increase in Ec̃2 is low at all levels of c1.






c̄. By direct calculations it can be verified that γ̄ < γ̄ and w̄ > w̄ for γ < γ̄
(see Figure 1). This allows for stating the next result.
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(1 + γ)(x − y)Ω
{[
αγ(x − y)Eỹ − yΩ
]





(1 + γ)(x − y)Ω
{[
xΩ − αγ(x − y)Ex̃
]
w − (α + x)Ωc̄
}
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that γ > γ̄ implies that bond investments increase with income. Moreover, the
expression for b is strictly positive whenever γ ≥ γ̄ or when γ < γ̄ and w < w̄. The
inequality γ < γ̄ implies that the coefficient of w in the formula for s is strictly positive.
w > w̄ implies that the overall expression for s is strictly positive.
Proposition 3 shows that individuals invest in both assets, stocks and bonds, whenever
γ lies in an intermediate range and income is sufficiently high. To understand this note
that when γ is very high then the relative preference weight of Ec̃2 is so low that individ-
uals will never want to invest in stocks (see Proposition 2). Conversely, when γ is very
low, then the marginal value of an increase in c1 becomes very low whenever it sufficiently
exceeds c̄. For such low values of γ individuals will spend a large share of their income
on Ec̃2 and thus on s. As a consequence, c1 is rather low and habit consumption can
eventually be met entirely by equity savings. For intermediate values of γ and incomes
that allow financing a level of c1 which sufficiently exceeds c̄, the marginal values of c1
and Ec̃2 are sufficiently balanced. Hence, s is not so high, and c1 not so low, that habit
consumption can be met entirely by stock investments. Thus, individuals invest in both
stocks and bonds. A second case to which Proposition 3 applies is a low γ and an income
level which is not too high. Here, too, the marginal values of increases in c1 and Ec̃2 are
sufficiently balanced such that individuals invest in both assets.
With regard to empirical data (see Section 7), it is an important implication of Propo-
sition 3 that both the saving rate (b + s) /w and the equity share s/ (b + s) are predicted
to increase with income under the conditions of Proposition 3.9 The intuition for these
9For the saving rate this follows from the fact that the ratio c/w is decreasing in w. For the equity
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results follows from the fact that seeking to achieve a high level of Ec̃2 in the third goal in
1 becomes more and more important with a higher income. This stems from the fact that
a higher income allows to finance a higher level of c1, which moves further and further
apart from c̄. As a result, the marginal value of an increase of c1 becomes lower and lower
with respect to the marginal value of an increase in Ec̃2. This leads to a higher optimal
value of both savings and the proportion of savings invested in equities. Note that the
assumption of c̄ > 0 is vital for this result. In the case of c̄ = 0 saving rates as well as
equity shares would be constant.




c̄. It can be verified that ¯̄w > w̄ for 0 < γ <
y
α




(again, see Figure 1). The last proposition, dealing with the case where the
relative marginal value of an increase in c1 is low, reads as follows.




≤ γ < γ̄ and w ≥ w̄, or if γ <
y
α









(ii) If γ <
y
α












Proof. See Appendix A.
It is straightforward to show that under the conditions of Proposition 4(i), the first
constraint in (6) is binding, whereas this is not the case under the conditions of (ii).
Figure 1 integrates the results of Propositions 1 to 4 into a coherent picture, depicting
the different portfolio regimes in the γ/w-space. It should be noted that the different
share this can be shown by calculating the derivative d [s/ (b + s)] /dw.
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threshold values for w, i.e. w̄, w̄ and ¯̄w, can all be understood as hyperbolic functions of




they are strictly positive and increasing to the left of their jump discontinuities and
negative (and thus not of any interest) to their right. Note also that for γ = 0 we have
w̄ = ¯̄w > w̄ = wcrit. Furthermore, as mentioned previously,
y
α
< γ̄ < γ̄, w̄ < w̄ for γ < γ̄,




6 Calibrating the Model
This section discusses how the threshold model is calibrated, such that it is possible to
obtain quantitative predictions for saving rates and equity shares. These will then be
compared to empirical data for the U.S. Moreover, Section 8 will compare the calibration
results to the predictions of two often-used existing preference models.
With respect to the time setup of the model, I assume that an agent starts his life
cycle saving program at the age of 26, enters retirement at the age of 66 and dies with
certainty at the age of 86. This setup takes into account that retirement typically lasts
for fewer years than working life. The setup abstracts from mortality risk. This may be
seen as appropriate in an environment where agents have access to an explicit or implicit
form of annuities. Using the argument set out in Section 4, the average time horizon for
an agent’s retirement preparation problem is then 30 years.
The model will first be calibrated for a set of baseline parameter values that are chosen
as being plausible on a priori grounds. A straightforward idea for the determination of
α is to look at U.S. Social Security replacement rates. The latter range between 30
percent for high income levels and 60 percent for low income levels (Munnell and Soto,
2005). The underlying reason for this monotonic decline in income is that households
with a higher income level are supposed to engage in private retirement preparation.
Thus, Social Security replacement rates for higher income levels should be seen as lower
than minimally acceptable. In contrast, the Social Security replacement rates for low
income levels are set in such a way that they lead to a minimally acceptable standard
of living during retirement in the absence of private retirement preparation. Thus, 60
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percent seems an a priori natural benchmark value for α. However, this value needs to
be adjusted to the time setup of the model. Implicitly, Social Security replacement rates
compare expenditure levels of two periods with equal length, e.g. of two different years
such as one during working life and one during retirement. However, the two periods
in the model are not of equal length. To correct for this, the raw replacement rate of
60 percent has to be multiplied by the ratio of the length of retirement to the length of
working life, i.e. by one half, according to the above assumptions. This leads to a baseline
value for α of 0.30.
As c̄ represents a normal standard of living, it would be natural to identify it with
median consumption of the total U.S. population. There are, however, no good data
available. Thus, I set c̄ to the upper limit of the second income quintile for the year 2001,
amounting to 33 thousand year-2001 U.S. dollars.10 11 The parameter γ can be interpreted
as the inverse of a time discount factor. It is thus set to the inverse of 0.96 to the power
of 30, as 0.96 represents a standard specification for an annualized discount factor.
Turning to the economic environment, it is necessary to numerically specify the dis-
tribution of bond and stock returns. In this respect, I adopt standard assumptions from
the literature.12 Specifically, annual gross returns of bonds are set to 1.02, assuming that
they are risk-free. Annual net returns are thus equal to 2 percent. The distribution of
stock returns is derived as follows. It is assumed that the mean and standard deviation of
annual gross returns are equal to 1.06 and 0.157, respectively. I assume further that an-
nual log-returns are distributed normally with parameters corresponding to a level mean
and standard deviation of 1.06 and 0.157, respectively. This allows for a determination
of the mean and standard deviation of 30-year level returns, assuming that stock returns
are identically and independently distributed over time. I proceed by drawing 1,000,000
draws from the 30-year distribution, yielding a “data set” of stock returns. The minimum
return is then set to the first percentile of the 30-year distribution, while the expected
10Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables. See http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
income/histinc/h01ar.html
11The year 2001 has been chosen since model predictions will be compared to empirical equity shares
obtained from the 2001 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances.
12See e.g. Campbell and Viceira (2002).
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return is set to 1.0630.
7 Calibration Results for the Threshold Goal Model
Figures 2 and 3 present the results for the baseline calibrations for saving rates and eq-
uity shares, respectively. The solid lines refer to model predictions while the dashed lines
correspond to empirical estimates. Empirical saving rates are taken from Dynan et al.
(2004) and represent separate estimates of saving rates for each income quintile.13 It is
important to stress that these savings rates include prospective income from Social Secu-
rity, which is converted into a notional saving rate and added to observed private savings
rates. Furthermore, these saving rates include private pensions.14 Such all-inclusive sav-
ing rates provide the natural empirical benchmark for evaluating quantitative predictions
that are obtained in a setup that abstracts from private and public pensions.
Equity shares are obtained from the 2001 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF). I define brackets with a width of 20,000 year-2001 U.S. dollars that are symmetric
around the median quintile income levels that refer to the five Dynan et al. estimates of
saving rates. For each bracket I calculate the median equity share, defined as the median
of the ratio of equity holdings to total financial assets. For the five percent of observations
with no financial assets the equity share is set to zero. Equity holdings include indirect
holdings through mutual funds and pensions.15
13The estimates for saving rates refer to ages between 40 and 49. The differences to savings rates for
the 30-39 as well as for the 50-59 age group are quantitatively small (see Table 3 in Dynan et al., 2004).
14Specifically, saving rates are taken from the “Active+Pension” column in Table 3 of Dynan et al.
(2004). I am grateful to Karen Dynan for kindly providing information about median incomes for the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
15The dashed line in Figure 3 is based on all SCF observations with age below 65, which corresponds
to the fact that the model aims to explain equity allocation choices during working life. It should be
mentioned that the shape of the empirical equity curve is fairly similar for narrower age classes, such as
ages from 30 to 39, 40 to 49 etc. Furthermore, similar curves are obtained for different SCF education
classes, except for the lowest. Finally, it should be mentioned that the shape of the empirical curve in
Figure 3 cannot be biased by time effects, since all data refer to the year 2001. Time effects can only
influence the position of the curve. Whether cohort effects may affect the shape of the empirical equity
curve is a more subtle issue. They do not seem a prime reason of concern in the context of this study,
however, since, as already mentioned, the empirical equity curve exhibits a similar shape for different age
classes.
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As shown in Figures 2 and 3, both empirical saving rates and equity shares increase
substantially with income. The threshold goal model is well able to explain the general
shape of these curves. In particular, the model is able to explain non-participation in
the stock market for the lowest income quintile. This follows from the fact that only the
first two goals in the list (1) are active for the first income quintile under the baseline
parameter values. It should again be stressed that the model explains non-participation in
the stock market at low income levels in the absence of fixed costs of market participation.
(See Section 5 for a discussion of this result.) In contrast, it is a well known fact that
expected utility models generically predict stock market participation at all income levels
in the absence of fixed costs of market participation. Moreover, predicted equity shares
are quit high for low income levels for standard parameter values (see next Section).
As discussed in Section 5, the intuition for increasing saving rates and equity shares
follows from the fact that seeking to achieve a high level of Ec̃2 in the third goal in (1)
becomes more and more important with a higher income. This stems from the fact that a
higher income allows to finance a higher level of c1 which moves further and further apart
from c̄. As a result, the marginal value of an increase of c1 becomes lower and lower with
respect to the marginal value of an increase in Ec̃2. Remember from Section 5 that c̄ > 0
is crucial for the prediction of increasing saving rates and equity shares. For c̄ = 0 both
curves would be flat.
In the next section the predictions of the threshold goal model will be compared to
those of alternative existing models. It is therefore useful to introduce a formal measure
of how closely a model matches the empirical estimates. I fill focus on the square root of
the mean squared error, averaged over both saving rates and equity shares, as a natural
loss function. Define empirical saving rates for quintile i by σ̂i and predicted saving rates
by σ∗i . Similarly, define empirical and predicted equity shares by ρ̂i and ρ
∗
i , respectively.



















For the baseline specification of the threshold goal model the FIT value amounts to
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0.1006.
In the rest of this section I will discuss calibration results for some alternative specifi-
cations. I first present three specifications where one parameter differs from the baseline
value at a time. This allows for clearer insights into the “mechanics” of the model. At
the end I will present a specification which minimizes the FIT value.
Figures 4 and 5 show simulations for α = 0.35 instead of 0.30. According to the logic
of Social Security replacement rates this would correspond to a replacement rate of 70
percent (see Section 6). Since the habit level αc1 is higher in this case precautionary
savings are higher. This shifts saving rates upwards and equity shares downwards with
respect to the baseline case. The FIT value amounts to 0.0725.
Figures 6 and 7 present results for c̄ = 25 instead of 33. In this case c1 departs sooner
from c̄. As a result, maximization of Ec̃2 is relatively more important in the third goal
of (1). Consistent with this logic, saving rates and equity shares are higher than in the
baseline case. The FIT value amounts to 0.1924.
Figures 8 and 9 present saving rates and equity shares for the case where γ is set to
0.94−30 instead of 0.96−30. This leads to both lower savings and lower equity shares since
c1 has a higher weight in the third goal in (1). As a consequence, Ec̃2 has a lower relative
weight. The FIT value amounts to 0.0702 in this case.
Finally, Figures 10 and 11 correspond to a set of parameter values that are chosen such
as to minimize the FIT value. The minimization has been carried out over the parameter
space A × C × Γ, where the three sets correspond to values for α, c̄ and γ, respectively,
and A = {0.25, 0.26, . . . , 0.40}, C = {15, 16, . . . , 35}, Γ = {0.80−30, 0.81−30, . . . , 0.98−30}.
The resulting best fit values are α = 0.27, c̄ = 29, γ = 0.94−30. The value for α of 0.27
corresponds to a pension income replacement rate of 54 percent according to the logic of
Social Security replacement rates. It should be stressed that these parameter values are
fairly close to the baseline parameters and do not strike as unnatural, if only the value of
α is somewhat low.16
Figures 10 and 11 show that the fit is practically perfect for equity shares and very
16See Frederick et al. (2002) for a list of empirical estimates for discount rates. A annual value of 0.94
for the discount rate does not seem low at all in light of their discussion.
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good for saving rates. The formal FIT value is 0.0226. This fit is so favorable that it
naturally invokes some skepticism. A first issue that comes to mind is that any model
with three free parameters may lead to a very favorable fit, if the fit is optimized over
parameter values. Second, it may be the case that the threshold goal model has some
hidden “degrees of freedom” in that the third preference goal in (1) is only triggered if
income is sufficiently high. Therefore, saving rates and equity shares for lower income
quintiles could be matched independently of saving and asset allocation choices for higher
income quintiles.
An immediate objection against the last argument is that it is only the first quintile for
which the third goal in (1) is not activated under the best-fit parameter values. However,
the fit of the model is also very favorable for just the upper four income quintiles where
always all goals are active. Nevertheless, the question of whether the fit obtained in
Figures 10 and 11 is a true achievement of the threshold goal model or whether it may
be obtained for any model with similar degrees of freedom can only be addressed by
explicitly engaging in a similar exercise for alternative preference models. This is the topic
of the next section. There, I will present simulations for constant relative risk aversion
preferences as well as hyperbolic absolute risk aversion preferences. The conclusion will
be that the threshold goal model performs much better than alternative existing models,
even when generously controlling for possible differences in the degrees of freedom to the
benefit of existing models.
8 Saving and Asset Allocation under CRRA and HARA
preferences
The two-period constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) model is given by











The parameter η represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion and β represents the
time discount factor. E stands for the mathematical expectation operator. It is assumed
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that these preferences are maximized subject to the budget constraints c1 + b + s +
kI (s > 0) = w and c̃2 = bx + sỹ, as well as subject to b ≥ 0, s ≥ 0. I represents the
indicator function and k represents a fixed costs of stock market participation. It is a
well-known fact that in the absence of such fixed costs stock market participation always
occurs for any expected utility preferences. There are thus three parameters: η, β and
k. Figures 12 and 13 present simulations for the CRRA model for a set of parameters
values that many economists would view as baseline values. Specifically, η is set to 3 and
β to 0.9630. Furthermore, k is set to a quarter of a monthly income. More precisely, if
wi denotes the median annual income for a particular income quintile i, then k is set to
0.25wi/12 for income quintile i. In my view this represents an upper bound of plausible
values for fixed costs of stock market participation.
Figures 12 and 13 show that the fit obtained for this parameter specification is
mediocre, at best. This is particularly worrisome in light of the fact that the CRRA
model, also in its two-period version, is heavily used for developing basic insights about
life cycle saving and retirement preparation. Both saving rates and equity shares are
predicted to be constant. Saving rates are excessively high. Furthermore, although the
fixed entry cost of stock market participation is high, it is not sufficient for preventing
stock market entry for the first income quintile.
I turn next to a calibration that optimizes the fit for the CRRA model. Since this
model, as stated above, has three parameters, its degrees of freedom can be seen as
comparable to the threshold goal model with its three parameters α, c̄ and γ. However, it
can be argued that for the latter preferences differ between lower and higher income levels,
since the third goal in (1) may not be active for low levels of income. Thus, referring to the
fact that there are only three parameters one may understate the model’s true flexibility
in matching empirical data. Therefore, it may not be fair to directly compare the fit of
the threshold goal to the normal version of the CRRA model.17 I consider therefore a
17Remember, however, that for all but the lowest income quintile all three goals of the threshold goal
model are active for almost all specifications discussed in the last section. Thus, for the upper four
quintiles the number of degrees of freedom for the threshold goal model is well captured by the number
of parameters. The fit of the threshold goal model is much better than for any parameter values of the
baseline CRRA model even when the comparison is restricted to the upper four quintiles. The reason is
that the predicted saving rates and equity shares are always flat for the CRRA model.
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version of the CRRA model where η is allowed to take on a different value for each income
quintile. Furthermore, the values of k may differ between income quintiles. In contrast,
β is constrained to be identical for all income levels. Specifically, for each income quintile
η may take on one of the values of the set {1, 2, . . . , 15}, while k may amount to either
one quarter or one tenth of a month’s income. The discount factor β may take on any of
the values {0.80, 0.81, . . . .0.98} to the power of 30.
The best fit is obtained for a sequence (1, 8, 4, 3, 2) of η-values over income quintiles.
Furthermore, the best fit value for k is equal to one quarter of monthly income for the
first quintile and may take on either value for the other quintiles. The optimal value for β
amounts to 0.8830. Figures 14 and 15 present the corresponding saving rates and equity
shares. In light of the high degree of flexibility that has been invoked for optimizing the
fit for the CRRA model the result is lackluster. The best-fit model is able to match equity
shares quite well. However, this is only achieved thanks to the large jumps in the values
for η. In contrast, the model is barely able to match empirical saving rates. The FIT
value amounts to 0.0732, compared to 0.0226 for the threshold goal model.
I turn next to the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) model. Specifically, I
consider a basic version of the model where CRRA preferences are augmented by age-
specific subsistence consumption levels, represented by the two parameters c̄1, c̄2 in











It can be shown that non-zero values for c̄1, c̄2 lead to non-flat saving rate and equity share
profiles.18 Since there are no well-established baseline values for these two parameters I
directly consider a calibration that optimizes the fit to the empirical data. Since the
effects of letting η vary between income levels has already been explored above, I consider
now the effects of allowing c̄1, c̄2 to differ between income quintiles. Specifically, they may
each take on a value between 0 and 15 and need not be equal to each other. The fixed
cost k is again either equal to one tenth or one quarter of monthly income and may also
differ between income levels. The discount factor β is restricted to be identical for all
18The profiles for saving rates can be either increasing or decreasing.
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income levels and may take on any value in the set {0.80, 0.81, . . . .0.98} to the power of
30. Finally, η is simply set to 3. Note that this model has more degrees of freedom then
the version of the CRRA model examined above, since three parameters may now vary
with income.
The sequence of best-fit values for c̄1 and c̄2 are given by (12, 15, 2, 1, 1) and (0, 11, 2, 0, 0).
The best fit value for k is a quarter of monthly income for the first quintile and one tenth
otherwise. The best fit value for β amounts to 0.9030. The simulation results are shown
in Figures 16 and 17. The FIT value amounts to 0.0633, compared to 0.0226 for the
threshold goal model.19
Evidently, the versions of the CRRA and HARA model considered above have by
far more degrees freedom to match the data than the threshold goal model. Even when
equipped with such an enormous degree of flexibility their ability to explain the cross-
section of saving and asset allocation choices is quite weak. In light of the above it seems
fair to conclude that the favorable fit of the threshold goal model, shown in Figures 10
and 11, is due to an intrinsic ability of this model to capture some of the important deter-
minants of individuals’ behavior. This fit cannot merely be explained by the flexibility of
the threshold goal model offered by the fact that not all goals are activated at low income
levels.20
Some readers may worry that the favorable performance of the threshold goal model
is limited to savings and asset allocation data and, within this domain, to two-period
models. Concerning the first issue, I would not easily accept to perceive this as a problem
even if this was the case, since saving and asset allocations represent important economic
data that are highly relevant for individual welfare. Concerning the second issue it is
19At first sight, it may seem that simple existing models of habit formation would do a better job than
HARA models explaining the cross-section of saving and asset allocation choices. From a mathematical
point of view this can, however, not be the case since, for given predictions of any (simple two-period)
habit formation model, it is always possible to find a HARA model with appropriate parameter values
such that its predictions are identical to the given habit formation model.
20Another existing model that is sometimes used for studying life cycle choices is the Epstein-Zin model.
This model has not been explored here since it shares the property with the CRRA model that predicted
savings and equity share profiles are flat. Thus, non-flat profiles can again only be obtained if one is
willing to assume that preferences parameters differ between different income groups, which I view as
unsatisfactory.
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shown in Binswanger (2007a) that a multi-period extension of the threshold goal model
also performs better than existing models.
9 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a new model for studying life cycle saving and asset allocation
decisions. The defining property of this model is that it incorporates short-cuts that
simplify these complex decisions. These short-cuts come in the form of so-called threshold
goals.
It has been demonstrated that the new model explains the cross-section of empirical
saving and asset allocation choices much better than existing standard models such as the
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) or the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA)
model. Beyond this, the new model has some further advantages. First, as shown in
Binswanger (2007a), it can be extended to a multi-period model. The multi-period gen-
eralization allows to explain further asset holding phenomena that are puzzling from the
perspective of existing models. These are related to how stock market participation and
equity shares vary with age. These phenomena can be explained for the same parameter
values that have been shown to provide a good explanation of cross-sectional savings and
asset allocation data in this paper. Second, the threshold goal model is very tractable.
Third, it is highly transparent and therefore allows to gain some basic insights about life
cycle saving and retirement preparation in a very straightforward way. These insights
allow, for instance, to draw conclusions about how to compose a pension system out of a
pay-as-you-go and funded components (Binswanger 2007b).
A major aim of this paper is to convince economists that simple alternatives to existing
expected utility models do exist that incorporate realistic features of real-world decision
making. It has been shown by means of an example that such models can be parsimonious
and at the same time useful for understanding important empirical data. This seems thus
a promising route for future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Consider problem (6). Remember that for w = wcrit we have exactly c1 = c̄ from Propo-
sition 1. It follows that problem (6) is well defined if and only if w > wcrit. Note that the
second constraint in (6), and thus also the nonnegativity constraint for c1, do not have to
be explicitly taken into account. The reason is that at c̄ the marginal value of an increase
in c1 is infinite. This guarantees that we will always have c1 > c̄. Using this and the
budget constraints, the Lagrangian for program (6) can be written as
L = γ ln(w − b − s − c̄) + ln(bEx̃ + sEỹ) + λ[bx + sy − α(w − b − s)] + µb + νs, (7)






w − b − s − c̄





w − b − s − c̄
+ (α + y)λ + ν = 0, (9)
λ ≥ 0, bx + sy − α(w − b − s) ≥ 0, λ
[
bx + sy − α(w − b − s)
]
= 0, (10)
µ ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, µb = 0, (11)
ν ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, νs = 0. (12)
It can easily be checked that the objective function is strictly concave in b and s. More-
over, all constraints are linear. Thus, not only are the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (8)-(12)
necessary and sufficient for an optimum, but optimal choices are also unique.
The proofs below will make use of the following definitions.
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Proof of Proposition 2
It has to be checked that the first order conditions (8)-(12) hold for some appropriate

























It is straightforward to show that (8) and (9) hold for these multipliers (use w−b−s =
c1 and s = 0). Inserting for c1, b, s in the expression for λ and rearranging shows that
λ ≥ 0 if and only if
(x − αγ) w ≤ (α + x) c̄. (13)
Either γ < x
α
or γ ≥ x
α





< γ̄. Thus, the conditions of Proposition 2 only hold if w ≤ w̄. Check further
that w̄ < α+x
x−αγ
c̄. Thus, w < α+x
x−αγ
c̄ holds under the conditions of Proposition 2 for γ < x
α
.
In the case where γ ≥ x
α
, (13) always holds since the expression on the right-hand side
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is strictly positive. From this and from the fact that bx = αc1 and s = 0, it follows that
(10) holds.
It remains to check (11) and (12). The first condition is obvious. Consider thus the
latter. Clearly, s ≥ 0 and νs = 0. Inserting the expressions for c1, b stated in Proposition
2 into the expression for ν above shows that ν ≥ 0 if and only if
[
xΩ − αγ(x − y)Ex̃
]
w ≤ (α + x)Ωc̄.
This inequality holds whenever γ ≥ γ̄. For γ < γ̄ it holds whenever w ≤ w̄. We conclude
that all first order conditions hold for the indicated values of the multipliers under the
conditions of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
It has to be checked that the first order conditions (8)-(12) hold for some appropriate









Inserting the values for c1, b, s, as they are stated in Proposition 3, and rearranging
shows that (8) holds for the indicated values of the multipliers (use w − b − s = c1).
Inspection of (8) and (9) reveals that the latter condition holds whenever the former
holds. To check this, solve (8) for γ
w−b−s−c̄
and insert the resulting expression as well as
the expression for λ into (9). Consider next (10). Clearly, λ > 0 from Assumption 1.
Check by inserting for c1, b, s that bx + sy = αc1. Thus, (10) holds. Check next (11).
Clearly, µ ≥ 0. Moreover, we have b > 0 if γ ≥ γ̄. For γ < γ̄, b > 0 is implied by w < w̄.
Finally, consider (12). We trivially have ν ≥ 0 and νs = 0. Moreover, γ < γ̄ and w > w̄
imply s > 0. We conclude that all first order conditions hold for the indicated values of
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the multipliers.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of (i). Again, it has to be checked that the first order conditions (8)-(12) hold for


























It is straightforward to check that (8) and (9) hold (use w− b−s = c1). Consider next
(10). Insert for c1 and s in the expression for λ. Rearranging shows that λ ≥ 0 whenever
(αγ − y)w ≥ −(α + y)c̄. (14)
Thus, λ ≥ 0 if γ ≥
y
α
. For γ <
y
α
we have λ ≥ 0 whenever w ≤ ¯̄w. It follows from this
and from sy = αc1 and b = 0 that (10) holds.
Consider next (11). Insert for c1 and s in the expression for µ. Rearranging shows
that µ ≥ 0 whenever
[
yΩ − αγ(x − y)Eỹ
]
w ≥ (α + y)Ωc̄.
The inequalities γ < γ̄ and w ≥ w̄ imply µ ≥ 0. Since b = 0, we conclude that (11) holds.
Finally, it is straightforward that (12) holds.










Simple calculations show that (8) and (9) hold. (Insert for c1, b and s to check the latter
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condition). Consider now (10). Inserting for c1, b, s shows that bx+sy−αc1 ≥ 0 whenever
(y − αγ)w ≥ (α + y)c̄.
This is implied by γ <
y
α
and w > ¯̄w. (Note that the latter inequalities imply γ < γ̄ and
w > w̄.) This and λ = 0 imply (10). Consider next (11). Inserting for c1 and s shows
that µ ≥ 0 is implied by Assumption 1 and by the fact that w > c̄. Since b = 0, it follows
that (11) holds. Finally check (12), which holds in case that s ≥ 0. This, again, is true
because w > c̄.
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Figure 2: Saving rates for α = 0.3, γ = 0.96−30, c̄ = 33




















Figure 3: Equity shares for α = 0.3, γ = 0.96−30, c̄ = 33























Figure 4: Saving rates for α = 0.35, γ = 0.96−30, c̄ = 33




















Figure 5: Equity shares for α = 0.35, γ = 0.96−30, c̄ = 33























Figure 6: Saving rates for α = 0.3, γ = 0.96−30, c̄ = 25




















Figure 7: Equity shares for α = 0.3, γ = 0.96−30, c̄ = 25























Figure 8: Saving rates for α = 0.3, γ = 0.94−30, c̄ = 33




















Figure 9: Equity shares for α = 0.3, γ = 0.94−30, c̄ = 33























Figure 10: Saving rates for α = 0.27, γ = 0.94−30, c̄ = 29




















Figure 11: Equity shares for α = 0.27, γ = 0.94−30, c̄ = 29























Figure 12: Saving rates for CRRA preferences, baseline




















Figure 13: Equity shares for CRRA preferences, baseline























Figure 14: Saving rates for CRRA preferences, best fit




















Figure 15: Equity shares for CRRA preferences, best fit























Figure 16: Saving rates for HARA preferences, best fit


















Figure 17: Equity shares for HARA preferences, best fit
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